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I.
INTRODUCTION

When the defendant in an employment case is a college or other
institution of higher education, the plaintiff usually will face an "academic
deference" argument. Citing the importance of "academic freedom,"
defendants and sympathetic courts have asserted that "[o]f all fields ...the
federal courts should hesitate to invade and take over, education and faculty
appointments at a University level are probably the least suited for federal
court supervision."' Whether or not courts cite the "academic deference"
doctrine expressly, they certainly have proven hostile to professors' claims
of discrimination, dismissing as a matter of law claims that seemed quite
1. Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974) (gender discrimination case
under Title VII); see also Jiminez v. Mary Washington Coll., 57 F.3d 369, 377 (4th Cir. 1995) ("[W]hile
Title VII is available to aggrieved professors, we review professorial employment decisions with great
trepidation .... The federal courts have adhered consistently to the principle that they operate with
reticence and restraint regarding tenure-type decisions."); Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 21, 26 (1st
Cir. 1994) ("[C]ourt review of tenure decisions should be guided by an appropriately deferential
standard. A court may not simply substitute its own views concerning the plaintiffs qualifications for
those of the properly instituted authorities; the evidence must be of such strength and quality as to
permit a reasonable finding that the denial of tenure was 'obviously' or 'manifestly' unsupported. The
district court appropriately applied this standard to the present case, even though this is a case not of
denial of tenure but of denial of appointment to a tenure track position.") (citation omitted); Dorsett v.
Bd.of Trustees for State Coils. & Univs., 940 F.2d 121, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1991) ("In public schools and
universities across this nation, interfaculty disputes arise daily over teaching assignments, room
assignments, administrative duties, classroom equipment, teacher recognition, and a host of other
relatively trivial matters. A federal court is simply not the appropriate forum in which to seek redress
for such harms. We have neither the competency nor the resources to undertake to micromanage the
administration of thousands of state educational institutions.") (citations omitted); Carlile v. S. Routt
Sch. Dist. RE 3-J, 739 F.2d 1496, 1500-01 (10th Cir. 1984) ("courts are reluctant to review the merits of
tenure decisions," and defendants in such cases "are given wide latitude in discretion concerning whom
to award tenure"); Smith v. Univ. of N. Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 345 & 345 n.26 (4th Cir. 1980)
("University employment cases have always created a decisional dilemma for the courts. Unsure how to
evaluate the requirements for appointment, reappointment and tenure, and reluctant to interfere with the
subjective and scholarly judgments which are involved, the courts have refused to impose their
judgment as to whether the aggrieved academician should have been awarded the desired appointment
or promotion . . . . 'We, therefore, refuse to embark upon a comparative inquiry .. .into either the
quantity or the quality of the published scholarly contributions of the University's faculty members who
have been granted or denied promotion."') (citations omitted). Cf Lynn v. Regents of Univ. of Calif.,
656 F.2d 1337, 1344 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversing defense judgment in Title VII gender discrimination case
but noting "the relative ease with which the courts of appeals have found the employer's burden to be
satisfied in the academic context").
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strong, or at least solid enough to allow a factfinder to rule either way. 2
Indeed, according to one study, "[fjaculty plaintiffs prevail on the merits in
civil rights cases only about one quarter of the time."3 The bulk of the
"academic deference" precedents are gender discrimination cases, which
illustrates the extent to which the doctrine has been a significant barrier to
the use of Title VII to redress the gender segregation that has proven so
persistent in academia and various professions.4
This Article argues that courts should reject the entire idea of a special
"academic"
deference to employment decisions challenged as
discriminatory. The legislative history shows that Congress did not intend
any special deference for academia, and there is no need for it, because
courts can and do look for discrimination in other similar fields of
employment. In many ways, there is less justification for deferring to
academic than other employers, both for policy reasons (because of the
importance of diversity in education) and doctrinal reasons (because of
academic employers' tendency to defend denials of tenure with little
evidence other than self-interested testimony as to entirely subjective
reasons). Courts' frequent refusals to scrutinize academic employment
decisions for discrimination risks leaving continued gender segregation and

2. See, e.g., Farrell v. Butler Univ., 421 F.3d 609, 616 (7th Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of
summary judgment to defendant on professor's sex discrimination claim; "As nonobjective as the
selection criteria ... may have been, this circuit and others have been reluctant to review the merits of
tenure decisions and other academic honors in the absence of clear discrimination. We have previously
recognized that scholars are in the best position to make the highly subjective judgments related with the
review of scholarship and university service."); Fisher v. Vassar Coll., 114 F.3d 1332 (2d Cir. 1997)
(reversing verdict for professor claiming sex and age discrimination). Perhaps illustrating the lengths to
which the appellate courts go in dismissing academic discrimination claims, both Farrell and Fisher
were split decisions, Farrella 2-1 panel decision and Fisher a hotly contested 12-judge en banc decision
that featured five dissenting judges and was abrogated by the Supreme Court shortly thereafter in Reeves
v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000). See also Courtney T. Nguyen, Employment
Discrimination and the Evidentiary Standard for Establishing Pretext: Weinstock v. Columbia
University, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1305, 1308-09 (2002) (criticizing Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224
F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000), yet another split (2-1 panel) decision affirming a defense grant of summary
judgment on a professor's sex discrimination claim, as "establish[ing] an evidentiary standard that
makes it too difficult for a plaintiff to survive a motion for summary judgment... [and] frustrat[ing] the
intent of Title VII by insulating universities from judicial scrutiny").
3. Barbara A. Lee, Employment Discriminationin Higher Education, 26 J.C. & U.L. 291, 292
(1999). In contrast, employment discrimination plaintiffs as a whole (i.e., not just academic plaintiffs)
prevail between 41 and 57 percent of the time, depending on the type of claim (e.g., retaliation claims
are the most successful, whereas race discriminations succeed less often than gender or age
discrimination claims). Id.
4. See supra note 2 (citing gender discrimination cases); see generally Martha S. West, Gender
Bias in Academic Robes: The Law's Failure to Protect Women Faculty, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 67 (1994);
Scott A. Moss, Women Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with Disturbing
Implicationsfor Both OccupationalSegregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 1 (2004) (discussing the persistence of occupational segregation by gender in a wide range of
occupations).
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inequality in a large and important sector of both the labor market and our
educational system.
While the "academic deference" doctrine has drawn criticism for quite
some time,5 this Article not only adds an additional voice to the chorus, but
also strikes a few additional notes. First, this Article analyzes various
unrelated strands of employment discrimination case law, mostly of recent
vintage, that severely undercut the doctrine as a basis for granting
employers summary judgment or judgment as a matter of law ("JMOL")-

5. See, e.g., West, supra note 4; Susan L. Pacholski, Comment, Title VII in the University: The
Difference Academic Freedom Makes, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1317, 1318 (1992) (noting that courts "have
traditionally exercised restraint in cases involving the academic decisions of colleges and
universities....
By granting college and university employees the right to sue their employers,
however, Title VII seems to mandate a departure from traditional judicial deference"); Mary Gray,
Academic Freedom and Nondiscrimination:Enemies or Allies?, 66 TEX. L. REV. 1591 (1988); Elizabeth
Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 961 (1982) (noting
that in many academic cases, "courts have adopted a 'hands-of' doctrine... [that] has been criticized as
a form of judicial abdication, inconsistent with the ... [Title VII amendments] that specifically removed
the exemption for academic institutions").
Courts also have drawn criticism for applying too broad an "academic deference" doctrine in
the context of reviewing challenges by expelled college students. See, e.g., Curtis J. Berger & Vivian
Berger, Academic Discipline:A Guide to FairProcess for the University Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV.
289, 334 (1999) (defending courts' deferential "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review of colleges'
dismissals of students for "academic failure," because deference "seems appropriate where the agency's
or school's decision calls for an expert judgment ....
But where a student's career may be at stake
because of an academic 'crime,' akin to fraud or copyright infringement, matters courts handle as factfinders routinely, colleges should not enjoy quite the same degree of deference")
West, for example, argues that courts adjudicating academic discrimination cases require
plaintiffs to undertake a difficult search for evidence of discriminatory intent-but then those same
courts "discount any evidence found and simply defer to academic expertise.... Courts have singled out
academic institutions for even greater deference than that accorded to other professional employers."
West, supra, 67 TEMP. L. REV. at 130-31. "Because of this deference, the courts avoid examining the
merits of tenure decisions. They also ignore or discount any evidence of gender bias in the actual
evaluation of the candidate's scholarship, teaching, or service. Furthermore, they are hesitant to accept
evidence of discrimination based on comparative evaluations of the files of men who have received
tenure, in contrast to the woman who has been denied. They simply refuse to scrutinize critically the
,academic' decision of the university." Id. at 133.
More pointedly, Bartholet and Gray criticize courts as "elitist" for being too reluctant to find
that white-collar professionals like themselves are guilty of discrimination.
Judges defer to the employers with whom they identify, and they uphold the kinds of selection
systems from which they have benefited. . . . [W]ith prestigious jobs, the courts show an
appreciation of the apparent rationality of the employment procedures at issue and a respect
for the decisionmakers involved. . . . By contrast, courts can readily strike down a civil
service test . . . because, not knowing or caring much about how blue collar workers are
chosen or promoted, judges find it easy to focus on the social harm of racial exclusion.
[C]ourts often profess their lack of expertise ....
But courts are surely more qualified to
intervene in academic decisions, with which they have some familiarity, than to decide who is
qualified to serve in highly skilled blue collar jobs ....
It is the courts' expertise, rather than
the lack of it, that makes them reluctant to interfere at the upper level.
Bartholet, supra, at 979-80; see also Gray, supra, at 1596-97 (offering similar critique more focused on
academia in particular).
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the procedural devices that doom most academic plaintiffs' claims. 6
Specifically, courts have stressed that, under the leading recent Supreme
Court precedent on proof of employment discrimination,7 summary
judgment and JMOL are inappropriate where employers' defenses are
vague and subjective8 or where employers' defenses rely too heavily on the
testimony of interested parties.9 Thus, even if the notion of academic
deference once had merit, it is in increasing tension with other, more firmly
grounded employment discrimination principles.
Second, this Article discusses the implications for the academic
deference doctrine of recent scholarship on the power of social norms in
unregulated markets.
While social norms can redress and prevent
discrimination in some contexts, academia is the sort of labor market in
which social norms are unlikely to be effective at preventing discrimination.
Consequently, the risk of continued inequities in academia remains high if
discrimination lawsuits are not a viable tool.
Third, this Article notes that even to the extent that courts accept the
doctrine of academic deference, the rationale for such deference is limited
to the context of promotion to tenure. Accordingly, courts applying the
doctrine to failure-to-hire cases are applying precedent sloppily, extending
a doctrine beyond its original rationale.
In short, the penchant of many courts to dismiss employment
discrimination claims based on "academic deference" is misguided in a host
of ways. It threatens to leave academia an island of civil rights lawlessness,
essentially exempt from Title VII-a dangerous outcome for a society in
which there is such gender inequity in academia and such a consensus that
equal educational opportunity is the path to social progress and personal
success.
II.
"DEFERENCE" TO EMPLOYERS:
THE EXCEPTION THAT SWALLOWS TITLE VII?

The main rationale for an "academic deference" doctrine is that courts
are ill-suited to evaluate professors' job performance, because the
evaluation involves such a high level of discretion and depends upon so
much specialized knowledge."
How can courts evaluate a professor's

6.
summary
7.
8.
9.
10.

See, e.g., supra notes 1, 2, and 5 (citing cases and articles discussing the dismissals, mostly on
judgment and JMOL, of academic cases).
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
See infra Part III.B.
See infra Part III.A.
See supranote 1.
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scholarship on Beowulf in the original Old English, or on competing
theories of cosmology? Even if judges understood the relevant writings,
how can they decide whether the plaintiffs theories of the unknowable are
"better" than those of rival professors? Courts sometimes go so far as to
refuse entirely to examine the plaintiffs qualifications, based on deference
to the defendant's "scholarly opinion":
even though plaintiff and certain supporting witnesses contend that his work
was of scholarly merit, his output was not so perceived by either the
threshold committees or the President himself. The fact alone that there is
disagreement as to the scholarly merit of plaintiffs output is sufficient

under these circumstances to mandate that the Court not review the merits
of [defendant's] academic decision and resolve issues of scholarly
opinion. "
The problem with this reasoning is that it would dissolve Title VII if
followed to its logical conclusion and extended to other areas of
employment. It would have courts defer to employers in a wide swath of
labor markets, whenever judges feel insecure about their knowledge of the
field. Although some have argued for such deference in interpreting
employment contracts requiring "cause" for termination, 2 this clearly is not
the state of the law of employment discrimination. After all, academia is
far from the only field in which evaluation of performance is discretionary
and entails highly specialized knowledge; the same is true of various other
fields in which federal courts, from the district level to the Supreme Court,
have allowed discrimination claims to prevail or survive dispositive
motions, such as:
* accounting partnerships; 13
"

14
administrative law judgeships;

*

law enforcement;

15

11. Torres v. City Univ. of New York, No. 90 Civ. 2278, 1996 WL 554575, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 1996). The court in this decision was issuing a decision as the finder of fact, not a summary
judgment decision in which it would have been required to construe doubt in favor of the plaintiff;
nevertheless, the degree of academic deference--declaring any examination of the merits
inappropriate-is striking.
12. See RIcHARD CARLSON, EMPLOYMENT LAW 680 (2005) (noting that in the context of
employment contracts prohibiting terminations without just cause, "deference to an employer's exercise
of managerial judgment ... tends to be especially important in wrongful discharge actions involving
upper- or middle-level managers... because an employer's standards for evaluating such personnel are
bound to be more subjective than the sort of standards that govern the productivity and performance of
factory workers...").
13. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) ("senior manager" challenging
denial of promotion to partner in accounting firm).
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*

engineering; 16

*

computer programming; 17 and

*

8
hard sciences such as chemistry.'

As the Supreme Court noted in affirming a finding that an airline's
mandatory retirement age for pilots and flight engineers was unlawful age
discrimination rather than a bona fide occupational qualification, "[e]ven in
cases involving public safety, the [Age Discrimination in Employment Act]
plainly does not permit the trier of fact to give complete deference to the
employer's decision."' 9 The airline's arguments were reminiscent of those
made by academic institutions-that if experts disagree on the merits,
courts must defer to the employer-and the Court's flat rejection of that
argument was striking:
Western argues that . "where qualified experts disagree as to whether
persons over a certain age can be dealt with on an individual basis, an
employer must be allowed to resolve that controversy in a conservative
manner." This argument ... virtually ignores the function of the trier of
fact in evaluating conflicting testimony ....
[T]he jury may well have
attached little weight to the testimony of Western's expert witness. A rule
that would require the jury to defer to the judgment of any expert witness
testifying for the employer, no matter how unpersuasive, would allow some
20
employers to give free reign to the stereotyp[ing] of older workers ....

Indeed, nowhere in the law is a defendant's denial entitled to such
special "deference" as to eliminate the need for judicial scrutiny of the
evidence-except, of course, "[i]n Wonderland, evidence is readily
excluded on the basis of a general denial:"
[Mad Hatter:] "[T]he March Hare said-"
"I didn't!" the March Hare interrupted in a great hurry.
"You did!" said the Hatter.

14. See, e.g., Feingold v. New York, 366 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2004) (Administrative Law Judge
challenging termination).
15. See, e.g., Mandell v. County of Suffolk, 316 F.3d 368 (2d Cir. 2003) (police captain/deputy
inspector challenging denial of promotions); Terry v. Ashcrofl, 336 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2003) (federal
"special agent" challenging denial of promotions).
16. See, e.g., W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (flight engineers and pilots
challenging mandatory retirement age); EEOC v. Ethan Allen, Inc., 44 F.3d 116, 120 (2d Cir. 1994)
("special projects engineer" challenging termination).
17. See, e.g., Chertkova v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 1996) (computer
programmer challenging termination).
18. See, e.g., Brodsky v. Hercules, Inc., 966 F. Supp. 1337 (D. Del. 1997) (chemist challenging
denial of promotion and termination).
19. W. Air Lines, 472 U.S. at 423.
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"I deny it!" said the March Hare.
"He denies it," said the King: "leave out that part." See Transcript, R.
v. Knave of Hearts (unreported) (King of Hearts, J.), reprintedin L. Carroll,
Alice's Adventures in Wonderland (1865), ch. 11.21
Perhaps the best precedent against a strong "academic deference"
doctrine is Kunda v. Muhlenberg College.2" In Kunda, the court recited the
basic academic deference argument, but it nevertheless upheld an academic
plaintiff's resounding victory: the jury found discrimination in the
plaintiffs non-promotion and denial of tenure, and the plaintiff won not
only back pay, but also an injunction requiring defendant to promote her
At length, Kunda explained that "academic
and grant her tenure.23
institutions and decisions are not ipso facto entitled to special treatment
under federal [discrimination] laws." 24 Kunda extensively discussed and
quoted relevant Title VII legislative history rejecting a strong "academic
deference" doctrine:
Congress did not intend that those institutions which employ persons who
work primarily with their mental faculties should enjoy a different status
under Title VII than those which employ persons who work primarily with
their hands ....
Discrimination .. .[in] education is as pervasive as discrimination in
any other area .... [B]lack scholars have been generally relegated to
all-black institutions, or have been restricted to lesser academic
positions . .

.

. Similarly. . . . women have long been invited to

participate as students

....

but without the prospect of gaining

employment as serious scholars.25

Supporting an argument against taking "academic deference" too
seriously is the fact that a number of academic plaintiffs have prevailed in
recent discrimination decisions.2 6 Kahn v. Fairfield University7 is an
20.

Id.

21.

Reese v. Anderson, 926 F.2d 494, 499 n.4 (5th Cir. 1991) (alterations in original).

22.

621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).

23.

Id. at 535.

Id. at 545 (emphasis added).
25. Id. at 550 (quoting legislative history of 1972 Amendments to Title VII: Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, H. REP. No. 92-238, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N.
2137, 2155 (1972)).
24.

26. See, e.g., Siler-Khodr v. Univ. of Tex. Health Sci. Ctr. San Antonio, 261 F.3d 542 (5th Cir.
2001) (affirming verdict in favor of assistant professor's claims of gender discrimination in
compensation); Abramson v. William Paterson Coll. of N.J., 260 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2001) (reversing
defense grant of summary judgment on professor's claim of discriminatory and retaliatory termination);
Tolbert v. Queens Coll., 242 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2001) (reversing defense grant ofjudgment as a matter of
law in Title VI educational discrimination case involving evaluations of graduate student performance);
Stem v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 131 F.3d 305 (2d Cir. 1997) (vacating defense grant of summary
judgment on professor's failure-to-hire claim of national origin discrimination); Kahn v. Fairfield Univ.,
357 F. Supp. 2d 496 (D. Conn. 2005) (denying defendant summary judgment on gender discrimination
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especially helpful precedent explaining how courts can and should
scrutinize the record for discrimination, even in the promotion-to-tenure
context:
The job requirements included a doctorate degree as well as "an established
reputation as an academician." ... [Plaintiff] had published six articles and
book chapters. In contrast, the man first offered the position had served as a
tenured professor at another institution for ten years, published four books
and twenty articles and book chapters ....
[Plaintiff] dispute[s] the true
level of importance placed on the candidates' academic records by the
Search Committee[,] argu[ing] that the retrospective emphasis on the
candidates' academic records serves as pretext for its discriminatory
animus[.]... [S]ummary judgment is not appropriate [because]... [a] jury
is free to credit or discredit testimony by University administrators and
members of the Search Committee.28
Thus, courts adjudicating academic employment discrimination claims
should engage in the standard inquiry: comparing qualifications with an eye
to whether the employer's asserted motivations are sufficiently implausible,
inconsistent, or incoherent that they appear to be a pretext for unlawful
discrimination.
III.
CHARACTERISTICS OF ACADEMIA
MAKING "DEFERENCE" INAPPROPRIATE

Courts and defendants arguing for "academic deference" stress
characteristics of academic employment that make judicial deference
appropriate. Less noted are three characteristics of academia that make
judicial deference inappropriate. First, tenure decisions in particular-the
main precedents supporting the academic deference doctrine-are closeddoor affairs in which the court has to take the defendant at its word for
various job qualifications and candidate assessments.29 Second, the reasons
given for tenure denials tend to be largely subjective-exactly the sorts of
reasons that either can arise from unconscious discrimination or can mask
intentional animus.3" Third, there is more, not less, need for the legal
system to redress discrimination in academia than in many other fields, both
claim of professor and associate dean); Elghanmi v. Franklin Coll. of Ind., No. IP 99-879-C H/G, 2000
WL 1707934 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 2. 2000) (denying college's motion for summary judgment on mathematics
professor's claim of national origin and religious discrimination in denial of tenure); Curley v. St. John's
Univ., 19 F. Supp. 2d 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (denying defendant summary judgment on professor's claim
that university stripped his graduate course load because of his age).
27. 357 F. Supp. 2d 496 (D. Conn. 2005).
28. Id. at 506-07.
29. See infra Part III.A.
30. See infra Part III.B.
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because gender segregation in academia remains so persistent and because
educational diversity and equal opportunity are of such great importance to
society.3
Tenure Decisions: Defendants' Reliance on Self-Interested Testimony

A.

Tenure decisions by nature are closed-door affairs in which
experienced faculty members evaluate the scholarship, teaching, and
collegiality (usually in that order) of their junior colleagues. Because few
concrete criteria exist for granting or denying tenure, it is difficult to find
tangible evidence of the reasons for a tenure denial. Quite often, the
evidence consists of the testimony of various decision-makers in the
defendant's employ--other professors, department chairs, and high officials
(e.g., a dean or provost).3" Given that these individuals are tenured
themselves, they likely are still working at the university when the
plaintiffs case comes to trial (or, more likely, to a summary judgment
motion) two or three years after the tenure denial.
One of the oddities of current Title VII doctrine is how few courts have
picked up on a passage from Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products.,
Inc.," indicating that courts cannot grant summary judgment or (identically)
judgment as a matter of law based on interested parties' testimony. Reeves,
the leading precedent on the parties' burdens of proof on summary
judgment or JMOL motions in employment discrimination cases, elaborated
as follows:
the court should review all of the evidence in the record. In doing so,
however, the court must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh
the evidence. "Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence,
and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of a judge." Thus, although the court should review the record as
a whole, it must disregard all evidence favorable to the moving party that
the jury is not required to believe . .

.

. That is, the court should give

credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that "evidence
supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, 34at
least to the extent that that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.
Especially in the latter part of the above passage, Reeves appears to
instruct that an employment discrimination defendant cannot win summary
judgment based on the testimony of its own agents and decision-makers,
See infra Part III.C.
32. For an informative glimpse of "the Byzantine tenure process" at a major university, see
Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 38-40 (2d Cir. 2000).
31.

33.

530 U.S. 133 (2000).

34.

Id. at 150 (citations omitted).
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because those witnesses are "interested," not disinterested, and therefore a
jury could choose to disbelieve their contradiction of the plaintiff's
allegations.3 5 Only one federal appeals court case has picked up on this
point explicitly, holding that "we must accept all the evidence favoring [the
plaintiff], but only the evidence favoring [the defendant] that is
uncontradicted and unimpeached and that comes from disinterested
witnesses. 3 6 Other courts have rejected this plain-text interpretation of
Reeves, fearing that it "would foreclose the possibility of summary
judgment for employers."3 7
Only in one appellate decision in an academic discrimination case has
this rule been recognized and proven decisive-and it was a student's
discrimination claim, not that of an employee. In Tolbert v. Queens
College,3" the Second Circuit held that a defendant could not win its motion
based on the testimony of the defendant's own agents and decision-makers,
because the district court's finding, "that defendants had 'conclusively
disproved' allegations of discriminatory policies,
plainly accepted as true the trial testimony of Liebman ... [and] Cairns.
Acceptance of their versions, however, was not within the province of the
court in ruling on a motion for judgment as a matter of law, for Liebman
and Cairns plainly were not disinterested witnesses; they are defendants.
Nor could Buchsbaum, though not a party, reasonably be considered a
disinterested
witness, for he was the coordinator of the . .. [defendant's]
39
program.

Although Tolbert addressed a grant of judgment as a matter of law in a
Title VI educational discrimination case, it is good law for employment
discrimination cases; it followed Reeves and applied the standards of Title
VII summary judgment precedents.40 In non-academic cases, Tolbert has
been followed recently as a cautionary note against granting defendants'
35. In contrast, an employment discrimination plaintiff opposing summary judgment can rely on
his or her own testimony. See Uy v. Bronx Mun. Hosp. Ctr., 182 F.3d 152, 156 (2d Cir. 1999) (rejecting
as "mistaken" the view "that the case was legally insufficient without corroboration of the plaintiffs
testimony," because such testimony (as to events and facts allegedly evidencing employment
discrimination) "is legally sufficient to create a jury question of the existence of [discriminatory]
animus").
36. Salitros v. Chrysler Corp., 306 F.3d 562, 569 (8th Cir. 2002).
37. Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893, 898 (5th Cir. 2002) ("Appellant contends
that Reeves requires us to disregard as interested witness testimony all testimony by managers involved
in the employment decision ... The definition of an interested witness cannot be so broad as to require
us to disregard testimony from a company's agents regarding the company's reasons ... As the Seventh
Circuit noted in Traylor v. Brown, et al., 295 F.3d 783 (7th Cir. 2002), to so hold would foreclose the
possibility of summary judgment for employers, who almost invariably must rely on testimony of their
agents to explain why the disputed action was taken.").
38. 242 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2001).
39. Id. at 72.
40. Id. at 70-71; Reeves, 530 U.S. 133.
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dispositive motions based on evidence, such as interested witnesses'
testimony, that a jury might choose to disbelieve.4
Indeed, in one academic discrimination case, among the "interested
witness" defense testimony that the court discounted on summary judgment
was testimony from "University administrators and members of the Search
Committee."4 2 Yet in many of the academic discrimination cases discussed
above, courts have granted summary judgment based on the testimonial
assertions of the search committee members and high university officials
accused of discrimination.
B. Subjective Reasons:
Reflecting Unconscious, or Masking Conscious, Discrimination
Decisions to promote or terminate faculty members are notoriously
Evaluations of scholarship, even if honest rather than
subjective.
pretextual, often are know-it-when-you-see-it opinions, such as that a
professor's "research lacked originality" or that, "measured by intellectual
strength and scientific ability, [the professor] was not in the same league as
other tenured [faculty]."43 One court went so far as to hold that conflicting
evidence of "scholarly merit" means that the court should "not review the
merits" at all."
Yet the subjectivity of academic employment decisions extends
beyond eye-of-the-beholder evaluation of scholarship, extending into
entirely personal characteristics. "Collegiality has been increasingly used
as a criterion in tenure and termination decisions," and it has been
"consistently upheld" by the courts as a basis for academic employment
41. See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 381 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Because
the standard of review ... requires us to credit the testimony that favors plaintiffs and does not allow us
to reverse the jury's verdict based on evidence the jury could have rejected, we do not set out, except in
general terms, defendants' refutation of plaintiffs' witnesses' testimony." (citing Tolbert, 242 F.3d at
70)), vacated on other grounds, KAPL, Inc. v. Meacham, 125 S. Ct. 1731 (2005) (remanding based on
restatement of ADEA disparate impact standards in Smith v. City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005));
Scott v. Rosenthal, No. 97 Civ. 2143 (LLS), 2001 WL 968992, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Aug 24 2001) (in
employee compensation suit, "Defendants . . . point to other statements by [plaintiff] Scott and to
[defendant] Rosenthal's testimony as contradicting Scott's expectation of compensation. Such evidence
raised serious questions of fact and credibility for the jury to resolve, which the court will not
reassess... " (citing Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 70)); Frink America, Inc. v. Champion Road Mach. Ltd., No.
7:96-CV-486, 2001 WL 34124761, at *2 n.3 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2001) ("Where conflicting evidence
existed, the Court disregarded evidence favoring Defendant" in evaluating judgment as a matter of law
in intellectual property case (citing Tolbert, 242 F.3d at 70)).
42. Kahn v. Fairfield Univ., 357 F. Supp. 2d 496, 506 (D. Conn. 2005) (holding, in employment
discrimination case, that "summary judgment is not appropriate [because] ... [a] jury is free to credit or
discredit testimony by University administrators and members of the Search Committee").
43. Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33, 39 (2d Cir. 2000).
44. See supra note 6 (discussing Torres v. City Univ. of New York, No. 90 CV 2278 (RO), 1996
WL 554575, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1996)).
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decisions, despite criticism of the criterion.45 Even if collegiality has come
into "increasing" explicit use, it always was present in academic decisionmaking; one of the earlier "academic deference" cases noted that in
academic employment decisions, "the personality of the candidate" is a
matter "of great importance. 4 6
Such subjective rationales may convince a jury, but it is doubtful that
they can support an award of summary judgment or judgment as a matter of
law-the tools commonly used to dismiss academic plaintiffs'
discrimination claims. Recent Title VII case law outside the academic
context clarifies that an award of summary judgment cannot be based on
purely subjective assertions. For example, in Mandell v. County of Suffolk,
the Second Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment to a (nonacademic) defendant that rejected the plaintiff for "'not project[ing] the
image ... [of] a positive grasp' of some unspecified 'areas' of interest to

[defendant]." 47 Mandell noted that a plaintiff can avoid summary judgment
without even directly countering such vague evidence:
though plaintiff does not present evidence directly contradicting defendants'
... stated reasons.., this failure is not fatal. .. . fA]n employer may not
rely solely on wholly subjective and unarticulatedstandards as a basisfor
its promotion decisions. An employer's explanation of its legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons must be "clear and specific. "... [Defendant's]

explanation of the negative impact of the 1997 interview is couched in
vague and general terms... [of a] "positive image" that... plaintiff failed
to project ... 48

In Patrick v. Ridge, also a non-academic case, the Fifth Circuit
eloquently clarified the point: "This does not mean that an employer may
not rely on subjective reasons for its personnel decisions. It does mean,
though, that to rebut an employee's prima facie case, a defendant employer
must articulate in some detail a more specific reason than its own vague and
conclusional feeling about the employee. 49
The problem is not only that vague, entirely subjective reasons fail
some burden of proof. Rather, the problem is that such reasons are not
rebuttals of discrimination allegations because they are entirely consistent
with discriminatory motivations, as Patrickexplained:

45. Mary Ann Connell & Frederick G. Savage, The Role of Collegiality in Higher Education
Tenure, Promotion,and Termination Decisions,27 J.C. & U.L. 833, 835 (2001).
46.
47.

Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1232 (2d Cir. 1974).
316 F.3d 368, 380 (2d Cir. 2003).

48. Id. at 381 (emphases added) (citations omitted).
49. 394 F.3d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 2004) (reversing defense grant of summary judgment where
defendant justified its failure to promote plaintiff by asserting that she was "not sufficiently suited" and

that the successful candidate was the "best qualified").
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a hiring official's subjective belief that an individual would not "fit in" or
was "not sufficiently suited" for a job is at least as consistent with
discriminatory intent as it is with nondiscriminatory intent: The employer
just might have found the candidate "not sufficiently suited" because of...
race, or engaging in a protected activity. 0
More broadly, courts have rejected summary judgment where a jury
could find discriminatory bias in criticism that only indirectly, not
explicitly, related to the plaintiffs group membership.
For example,
"purely indirect references to an employee's age, such as comments that an
employee needed to look 'sharp' . . . and that he was unwilling and unable
to 'adapt' to change, can support an inference of age discrimination."'"
In Kahn v. FairfieldUniversity,52 the court applied this line of case law
in an academic discrimination case, denying the defendant's summary
judgment motion on the rationale that while a search committee's
disparagement of the plaintiff as "arrogant" about "her own agenda" might
be fair criticism, "[s]uch characteristics might be considered positive,
leadership traits . . . [and] may also be considered improper gender
stereotypes."53 This recent decision should be a blueprint for courts
adjudicating professors' discrimination claims; yet given the current state of
the law, it is more of an aberration in a landscape of "academic deference"
decisions.
C. The Special Nature ofAcademia:
More, Not Less, JudicialScrutiny?
1.

The Persistenceof Gender Segregationand Inequality in Academia

If education is the future, then the future looks a lot like the past-at
least in terms of gender segregation and inequity. For example, women
comprise almost a third of all lawyers and law school faculties, but only
5.9% of tenured faculty members and 21.9% of full-time professors;5 4 in
contrast, more than two-thirds of all legal writing instructors are women. 5
More specifically, "[r]ecent empirical evidence suggests there is
occupational segregation in the legal profession":

50.

394 F.3dat 317.

51.

Machinchick v. PB Power, 398 F.3d 345, 353 (5th Cir. 2005).

52.

357 F. Supp. 2d 496 (D. Conn. 2005).

53.

Id. at 506.

54.
See AM. BAR AsS'N COMM'N ON WOMEN IN THE PROFESSION, A CURRENT GLANCE OF
WOMEN IN THE LAW 2 (200 1), available at http://www.abanet.org/women/glance.pdf.

55. Pamela Edwards, Teaching Legal Writing as Women's Work: Life on the Fringes of the
Academy, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 75, 75-76 (1997).
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Women tend to be over-represented in certain areas [,] ... more likely to
work in government and public interest jobs [,] ... more likely to specialize
in fields that are comparatively less lucrative, such as family law[, and]...
unlikely to work in bankruptcy, securities, and criminal cases involving
narcotics and organized crime.

6

Given that this level of segregation exists in academia and the
professional world, there would seem to be a compelling case for rooting
out gender discrimination in academia, not only because it is a significant
realm of professional employment, but also because universities and
professional schools are the gateways through which virtually all
professionals pass. The Supreme Court recognized a "compelling interest"
in academic diversity, sufficient to justify affirmative action even under
judicial "strict scrutiny," in Gratz v. Bollinger57 and Grutter v. Bollinger.5"
While those cases addressed student diversity, the argument for faculty
diversity, and at the very least equal opportunity for faculty, is no less
compelling.
Thus, there is a strong argument that the special place education holds
in society makes it more critical, not less appropriate, for courts to
scrutinize academia for discrimination. Yet whenever courts discuss the
special nature of academia in employment discrimination cases, they
invariably focus only on the less persuasive half of the story-the
"academic deference" rationale for scrutinizing academic employment
decisions less closely
2. The Inability of Social Norms to Police Academic Labor Markets
for Discrimination
As discussed above, thanks to the "academic deference" doctrine,
academic institutions face little prospect of successful employment
discrimination suits.59

Thus, to a substantial extent, the "academic

deference" doctrine has rendered academia an island of immunity from the
employment discrimination laws. This is a significant fact, because it
indicates that the scholarly attention lavished on academia is not just
professors self-indulgently analyzing themselves and their colleagues.
Rather, academia is a particularly interesting sector of the labor market to
study, because it provides a glimpse of the world we might see if we

56. Maryann Jones, And Miles To Go Before I Sleep: The Road to Gender Equity in the California
Legal Profession, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 1, 15-17 (1999).

57.
58.
59.
litigation
incentive

539 U.S. 244 (2003).
539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Certainly, even losing suits impose costs on employers. But when the only likely costs are
expenses and settlements of longshot cases, employment discrimination law's beneficial
effects on employers are likely to be minimal.
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followed the prescriptions of those who would eliminate, or substantially
weaken, the employment discrimination laws.
But even if academia is a field essentially free from enforcement of the
employment discrimination laws, a critical question remains: is that
necessarily a bad thing?
Some have argued, Richard Epstein most
famously, that unregulated free markets would eliminate inefficient
discrimination, because "[o]ne tendency of competitive markets is to drive
out inefficient forms of behavior, with discrimination as with anything
else."60 A rejection of good female or minority labor is an inefficient
sacrifice of productivity that places a firm at a competitive disadvantage,
Epstein notes; such a state of affairs cannot prevail widely, or for long, in
competitive markets. 6 Scattered discrimination may remain in especially
non-competitive sectors of the economy (e.g., government employment),
but by and large, if any discrimination persists for long, Epstein and
Richard Posner argue, it must be efficient discrimination based on actual
differences between, for example, male and female workers.6"
Even if one does not entirely accept the free-market logic that
discrimination cannot be a pervasive problem, one might accept a milder
form of the argument: discrimination cannot be as pervasive as commonly
believed, so there is no need for particularly aggressive enforcement of
employment discrimination laws. If so, then various narrow interpretations
of Title VII, including the "academic deference" doctrine, may be
appropriate. If discrimination cannot be as pervasive as a cursory review of
the gender inequity statistics would lead us to believe, then we should not
be so quick to infer discrimination based on circumstantial evidence.
Many persuasive arguments have been levied against the free-market
theory that inefficient discrimination cannot be particularly prevalent, 63 but
scholarship on the power of social norms provides further support for the

60.
(1994).

Richard A. Epstein, Standing Firm, On Forbidden Grounds, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1, 2

Id.
See, e.g., id. ("[C]ertain fortms of race, sex, age, and disability discrimination will continue to
survive in various quarters, but .. .invidious forms of discrimination will not."); RICHARD POSNER,
61.

62.

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 11.7 at 366-67 (5th

ed.

1998) ("First, not all discrimination is

inefficient. An example of efficient discrimination is the refusal (which is now unlawful) of employers
to pay pregnancy disability benefits .... Second, antidiscrimination laws can boomerang against the
protected class. . . . If for whatever reason women workers have a lower marginal product (maybe
because they have invested less in their human capital), employers will have an incentive to substitute
capital for labor inputs in those job classifications in which they employ many women").
63. See, e.g., Moss, supra note 4, at 77-78 (discussing and citing arguments that inefficient
discrimination may persist because of "various information problems endemic in real-world labor
markets[, ... opportunistic, anti-competitive 'cartel-like' behavior by dominant groups to exclude other
groups[,] .. . [and] [olther ways that discriminatory exclusion can be self-perpetuating" due to harmful
incentives and psychological effects that discrimination imposes on discriminated-against groups).
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notion that employment discrimination laws may be less necessary than
commonly assumed. Most prominently, Robert Ellickson documents how
lawsuits and enforceable legal rules may be surprisingly unnecessary,
because informal social norms can be quite powerful enforcers of fairness
and shared values.' Employers face exactly such social pressures not to
treat employees unfairly, scholars of social norms have argued. Jesse Rudy
cites statistics showing a "low number of arbitrary discharges" as evidence
that 'no discharge without cause' is a 'norm' and, accordingly, that "legal
protection is unnecessary because the norm provides adequate protection
for employees, even in the absence of the law"65 :
If the employer violates the norm often, she may be subject to feelings of
guilt and, more importantly, to non-legal sanctions from her employees ....
Current employees may begin to look for alternative employment and
gossip that the employer is a bad actor may spread among current
employees as well as to prospective job applicants[,] . . . put[ting] the
employer at a disadvantage when competing to hire and retain top
employees. On the other hand, if the employer follows the "no discharge
without cause" norm consistently, her employees will be encouraged to
make greater investments in the employment relationship than they would
with less job security.66

Thus, where a practice, such as discrimination, is not only inefficient
but also contrary to social norms, informal enforcement of those social
norms will complement free-market economic pressures. The stronger the
free-market pressures and social norms against discrimination, the less
necessary are employment discrimination laws-and the more appropriate
are narrow interpretations of those laws.
A full debate on the efficacy and limitations of social norms in labor
markets is beyond the scope of this Article,67 but for this Article's purposes,
the relevant question is a narrower one. Can academia's privileged
status-virtual exemption from the employment discrimination laws-be
justified by the notion that social norm pressures will prevent most
inefficient discrimination in academia? Is academia the type of labor
market in which social norms are likely powerful enough to obviate the
need for enforcement of discrimination laws?

64.

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991).

65. Jesse Rudy, What They Don't Know Won't Hurt Them: Defending Employment-At-Will in
Light of Findings That Employees Believe They Possess Just CauseProtection, 23 BERKELEY J. EMP. &

LAB. L. 307, 344-345 (2002).
66. Id. at 348.
67. See, e.g., Scott A. Moss, Where There's At-Will, There Are Many Ways: Redressing the
Increasing Incoherence of Employment At-Will, 67 U. PITT. L. REV. _
(forthcoming 2006)
(discussing, in Part IV, the efficacy and limits of social norms at assuring workplace fairness and
deterring wrongful terminations).
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If so--if, due to economic or social norm pressures or both,
discrimination cannot be prevalent in academia-then the substantial degree
of gender segregation and inequality in contemporary academia must be
efficient. This would lend support to the notion that male-female labor
market disparities result not from discrimination but from real male-female
differences; as former Harvard University President Lawrence Summers
opined, "innate differences between men and women might be one reason
fewer women succeed in science and math careers." 68
But there is a problem with the idea that social norm theory provides
support for the "academic deference" doctrine. The premise of the
academic deference doctrine is that information on a professor's
qualifications is difficult for outsiders to assess. Even courts reviewing
reams of documents on a professor's performance cannot easily discern
whether s/he truly merited the denied position. If it is prohibitively hard for
a court to figure out whether the professor was discriminated against or
simply was insufficiently qualified, then how could those who would
punish violations of social norms figure it out better?
A violation of social norms is punished not by some centralized
authority, but by masses of community members offended by the violation.
In the academic context, those masses would include other employees, job
applicants, students, and other community members. Of those, the best
informed would be the other employees, who may have hunches that the
professor did or did not suffer discrimination. But how many other
employees truly have all of the relevant information? How many have read
all (or even most) of the professor's scholarship, seen the professor's
teaching, or worked together with the professor? Certainly, most do not
have anywhere near as much information as a court reviewing a stack of
evidence that includes the relevant publications, teaching evaluations, and
various other employment records.
Various characteristics of academia serve to inhibit informal
enforcement of social norms. The highly specialized nature of academia
means that even within an academic department, one professor may know
almost nothing about another professor's field of scholarship. Academic
teaching and research, moreover, usually are highly individualized;
scientific collaboration aside, professors at the same school typically do not
engage in teaching and scholarship together.
Moreover, academic
employment is characterized by longer tenure, and less turnover, than in
many other industries; consequently, the risk that irate employees enforce
the social norm by departing is lower than in many other labor markets.
68. Catherine Pieronek, Title IX and Gender Equity in Science, Technology, Engineering and
MathematicsEducation: No Longer an Overlooked Application of the Law, 31 J.C. & U.L. 291, 292 n.5
(2005) (quoting speech by Summers).
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Beyond co-workers, the flow of information to other potential
enforcers of social norms-job applicants, students, community members,
and other institutions' academics-is even more limited. Job applicants and
academics at other institutions are likely to know nothing of the professor's
teaching, collegiality, or service to the institution. Students and community
members likely know little about the professor's scholarship, collegiality, or
service. In short, when a professor alleges discrimination, his or her
coworkers are likely to have imperfect and divergent guesses as to whether
there was discrimination, and non-coworkers are likely to have even less
basis for an opinion.
This lack of widespread information poses a major problem for those
who argue that social norms obviate the need for aggressive employment
discrimination law enforcement. What Ellickson showed is that informal
enforcement of social norms is a feasible substitute for law enforcement
when "members transact visibly (and so cannot cheat . . . easily) and are
interdependent (and therefore subject to punishment for cheating)." 69 But
as discussed above, academic employment decisions do not occur "visibly"
enough to allow others to know when employers break the antidiscrimination social norm.
The flow of information on academic
employment decisions is too sparse for social norms to hold much power.
In short, the premise of the "academic deference" doctrine (low
information flow) runs counter to a key assumption of social norm theory
(high information flow). Thus, social norm theory cannot provide support
for academic deference. If the "academic deference" doctrine is warranted,
it is because there is little transparency to academic employment decisions;
and if there is little transparency to academic employment decisions, then
social norms are unlikely to be particularly effective.
IV.
LIMITING THE "DEFERENCE" TO TENURE DECISIONS, NOT HIRING
DECISIONS

Finally, one less frequently noted criticism of the "academic
deference" doctrine is that even if it is appropriate, is should be limited to
the proper context: promotion-to-tenure decisions, not entry-level hiring
decisions. Indeed, most of academic deference precedents are not hiring
cases, but promotion cases involving evaluation of incumbent employees."0
69. Scott A. Moss & Daniel A. Malin, Public Fundingfor Disability Accommodations: A Rational
Solution to Rational Discrimination and the Disabilities of the ADA, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197,
200-01 (1998).
70. See, e.g., Weinstock v. Columbia Univ., 224 F.3d 33 (2d Cir. 2000); Lieberman v. Gant, 630
F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980) (denial of tenure); Bickerstaff v. Vassar Coll., 196 F.3d 435 (2d Cir. 1999)
(denial of promotion from associate professor to full professor). Cf Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d
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Nevertheless, courts adjudicating hiring cases have been known to

grant defendants summary judgment based on "academic deference" but
cite only promotion precedents. 7' More broadly, courts can be quite sloppy

in their rationales for "academic deference." One prominent precedent even
justified deference to an employer's allegedly discriminatory denial of
tenure by citing the deferential standard applicable to an expelled student's
longshot substantive due process claim.7" Supporting these ill-conceived

citations across disparate doctrines are the tenure precedents that paint with
too broad a brush-for example, declaring academic deference for any
"faculty appointments at a University level," not just tenure decisions.73

1229 (2d Cir. 1974) (transfer/demotion of research scientist to new position "without tenure
possibilities").
71. See, e.g., Bina v. Providence Coll., 39 F.3d 21, 26 (lst Cir. 1994) ("court review of tenure
decisions should be guided by an appropriately deferential standard. A court may not simply substitute
its own views concerning the plaintiffs qualifications for those of the properly instituted authorities; the
evidence must be of such strength and quality as to permit a reasonable finding that the denial of tenure
was 'obviously' or 'manifestly' unsupported. The district court appropriately applied this standard to
the present case, even though this is a case not of denial of tenure but of denial of appointment to a
tenure track position.") (citation omitted); Sarmiento v. Queens Coll. CUNY, 386 F. Supp. 2d 93, 98-99
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) (citing Lieberman, Faro, and Bickerstaff(see supra note 70) as employment precedents
for the Court's conclusion, in a claim of race discrimination and retaliation in a failure to hire an
assistant professor, that "Defendant's decisions regarding the professional experience and characteristics
sought in a candidate, as well as the search committee's evaluation of Plaintiff's qualifications, are
entitled to deference"), affd on other grounds, No. 05-1236, 153 Fed. App'x 21, (2d Cir. Oct. 28, 2005)
(not discussing "academic deference"); Kokes v. Angelina Coll., 220 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Tex. 2002).
(In the interest of full disclosure, the author wishes to mention that he represented the plaintiff-appellant
at the Second Circuit in Sarmiento.)
In Kokes, the court granted the employer, a community college, summary judgment in a
failure-to-hirecase brought by an unsuccessful applicant for a college instructor position. 220 F. Supp.
2d 661. Yet Kokes cited only two precedents, one a failure-to-promotecase and one a termination case
(neither of them academic cases) for the key principle: that courts should defer to decisionmakers'
evaluations of the candidates' qualifications. Id. at 666 ("' [T]he judicial system is not as well suited by
training and experience to evaluate qualifications ... in other disciplines as are those persons who have
trained and worked for years in that field of endeavor for which the applications under consideration are
being evaluated.' Discrimination laws were not meant to be 'vehicles for judicial second-guessing of
business decisions."') (quoting, respectively, EEOC v. La. Office of Cmty. Servs., 47 F.3d 1438, 1444
(5th Cir. 1995), and Walton v. Bisco Indus., Inc., 119 F.3d 368 (5th Cir. 1997)). As discussed above, the
argument for deference to decision-makers' evaluations is stronger when those decision-makers are
undertaking promotion (or termination) decisions based on their own personal, first-hand evaluations of
subordinates rather than hiring decisions based on the limited information contained in an application
plus (perhaps) an interview.
72. Okruhlik v. Univ. of Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 879 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of judgment as a
matter of law to university defendant, following a jury verdict for the plaintiff on her failure-to-promote
claim; "We are mindful of the singular nature of academic decision-making, and we lack the expertise to
evaluate tenure decisions or to pass on the merits of a candidate's scholarship ....
The Supreme Court
has made it clear that 'when judges are asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic decision,
•.. they should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment."') (quoting Regents of Univ.
of Mich. v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985), an expelled student's failed "substantive due process"
challenge).
73. Faro v. New York Univ., 502 F.2d 1229, 1231-32 (2d Cir. 1974)
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Yet other of the leading "academic deference" cases do carefully note
that tenure cases are quite different from hiring cases. In Lieberman v.
Gant,74 the Second Circuit distinguished its tenure context from another
case "concern[ing] renewal of a teaching contract rather than appointment
to tenure":
In contrast to an ordinary teaching position, terminable at the end of any
academic year, . . . tenure entails what is close to a life-long commitment by
a university, and therefore requires much more than the showing of
performance "of sufficient quality to merit continued employment" ....
Under such appropriately rigorous standards, a candidate for tenure does not
make out . . . a prima facie case merely by showing qualifications for
continuation as an untenured faculty .. ..
Similarly (and more recently), the Seventh Circuit, explaining the
rationale for academic deference, has stressed the nature of both the tenure
decision-making process and the long-term commitment tenure entails:
[T]enure decisions are often based on "the distinction between competent
and superior achievement." Such decisions necessarily rely on subjective
judgments about academic potential. Experienced faculty members may
well come to different conclusions when confronted with voluminous and
nuanced information about a colleague's overall capacity to make a longterm institutional contribution.76
Thus, if tenure cases warrant special "academic deference," it is based
on considerations particular to tenure-i.e., "life-long commitment" and
subjective evaluation based on close personal scrutiny of colleagues'
teaching and research in the decision-makers' own workplace. Those
considerations are absent in a failure-to-hire lawsuit. In the hiring context,
there is no justification for any thumb on the scale for the defendant; the
basic burdens of proof should apply, as in any discrimination case.
V.
CONCLUSION
It is odd that the "academic deference" doctrine has drawn such broad
judicial adherence yet so little judicial questioning. Courts treat it as
generally accepted, even though there are powerful arguments against it.
Worse, courts apply it in failure-to-hire cases, where it has even less
justification than it does in denial-of-tenure cases, which constitute the bulk
of the "academic deference" precedents.
74. 630 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1980).
75. Id. at 64.
76. Vanasco v. Nat'l Lewis Univ., 137 F.3d 962, 968 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting Kuhn v. Ball State
Univ., 78 F.3d 330, 331 (7th Cir.1996)) (emphases added) (affirming grant of summary judgment to
university in professor's denial-of-tenure claim).
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Yet the problem is not just that the "academic deference" doctrine, as
currently constituted, is unsound doctrine; it is also unsound policy.
Education is a field calling for special scrutiny, not special deference, by
courts endeavoring to assure that opportunities are equal and that the
current level of gender inequality is not the product of discrimination. It
might go too far to say that the courts' hands-off approach to academic
claims of discrimination is effectively a judicial repeal of Title VII for a
favored sector. But to the extent that Title VII has been weakened in that
sector, widespread judicial reluctance to scrutinize academic employment
decisions weakens the ability of Title VII to help us move forward in a
critical area of society. Fortunately, with various strands of case law
undercutting the premises of the "academic deference" doctrine, there is
hope for a better-late-than-never entry by the courts into a critical and
heavily segregated sector of the labor market.

